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THE LOST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: LESSONS FROM THE
UNPUBLISHED 1983 MARKUP BY THE HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE
PAUL TAYLOR* AND PHILIP G. KIKO**
[T]here has been much debate on the Equal Rights
Amendment .... I must say that I find myself
wondering why there is so much debate over what to
me is all a very simple proposition, which is that our
laws should treat men and women as individuals.
-- Representative Don Edwards (D-CA),
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, 19831
There's a question you hear around, and that is: "Which
is worse, ignorance or apathy?" The standard answer is,
"I don't know and I don't care." This answer, it seems
to me applies to the Equal Rights Amendment. If you
ask, "What does it really mean? What will it do to...
abortion rights, the law of the draft, whether Congress
will lose the right it now has to distinguish between
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1. Markup on H. J. Res. 1, and Amendments Before the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 6 (1983) [hereinafter "1983 House transcript"].
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male and female, the role of women in combat?" These
are sensible questions of public policy. The answer,
when you ask those questions, has to be "I don't know."
I don't know. In fact, the answer given by the chief
sponsor of the other body [the Senate] was that the
courts will decide, the courts will decide.
- Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), House
Judiciary Committee, 19832
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Rights Amendment3 (ERA) was first introduced in
Congress in 1923. 4 It was passed on to the states by Congress in 1972,
but it was not ratified by the required three-fourths of the states prior
to its expiration.5 In 1983, the ERA was re-introduced.6 It was the
subject of five hearings in the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, including one hearing called by the minority.7 It
was last debated and marked up in the House Judiciary Committee on
November 9, 1983. It was later brought up on the House floor under a
"suspension of the rules" in which no amendments are allowed, and in
which twenty minutes of debate time each was allocated to proponents
and opponents. 8 The ERA subsequently failed to pass the House of
2. Id. at 24. Senator Paul Tsongas, a Democrat from Massachusetts, was the chief
sponsor of the ERA in the Senate at the time. At a Senate hearing on the ERA, Senator
Tsongas was questioned by Senator Orrin Hatch, Republican from Utah and then Chairman of
the Senate Constitution Subcommittee. Senator Hatch asked Senator Tsongas questions
regarding the effect the federal ERA would have on government funding of abortions, sex
integration in public schools, and insurance rates, to which Senator Tsongas replied,
respectively, "[t]hat issue would be resolved in the courts," "[t]hese issues are going to be
decided in the courts," and "if we pass [the ERA], the issue will end up in court." The Impact
of the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong. 24-25, 29 (1985).
3. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any state on account of sex." 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 5.
4. H.R.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong. (1923).
5. The following states have never ratified the ERA: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.
6. H.R.J. Res. 1, 98th Cong. (1983).
7. See Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 335 (1983)
(hereinafter "Equal Rights Amendment House Hearings").
8. Editorial, ERA, But Not This Way, WASH POST, Nov. 15, 1983. ("The [Democratic
House] leadership has decided to bring the Equal Rights Amendment to the floor under a
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Representatives 9 by the required two-thirds vote1 ° in an effort led by
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Republican from Wisconsin.1
At the outset of the 1983 House Judiciary Committee markup
of the ERA-then styled as H.J. Res. 1-Representative
Sensenbrenner, who at the time was the Ranking Republican Member
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, asked, "Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the full
Committee transcript on H.J. Res. 1 be made an official record to be
published for purposes of legislative history."' 2 To this, Chairman
Peter Rodino replied, "Without objection, so ordered."' 13 However, the
committee debate was, remarkably, never subsequently published, nor
does any record of it reside in the Library of Congress. That is
unfortunate, as the debate that ensued was the last committee debate
on the ERA in a federal legislative body that passed it since 1972.14
The ERA was reintroduced in the 110th Congress in the House
of Representatives and its supporters vowed to bring it to a vote on the
House floor by the end of the legislative session, 15 forcing a new
evaluation of the proposal. No action was taken in the 110th Congress
but it is expected to be introduced again in the 111 th Congress. Such a
new evaluation would benefit greatly from an examination of both the
1983 House Judiciary Committee markup of the ERA and history
subsequent to 1983. During that 1983 markup, both Republicans and
Democrats on the committee raised several questions regarding the
legal effects such an amendment would have on the law. As a result,
they offered several amendments that, if passed, would have clarified
several areas in which the ERA's broad prohibition on sex
discrimination would have applied. All such amendments were
suspension of the rules. That's a procedure usually reserved for noncontroversial matters. Very
limited debate is allowed- only 20 minutes to a side-and no amendments can be
considered.").
9. The Senate did not vote on the ERA in the 98th Congress.
10. It failed by a vote of 278 to 147. 158 CONG. REc. 37,128 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Richard Bradee, Sensenbrenner leads ERA defeat, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1983 (on file with author) ("A rebellion against House Speaker Thomas P.
O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) headed by Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.) led to the failure of
the Equal Rights Amendment in the House Tuesday. The House fell six votes short of the two-
thirds majority needed to approve a constitutional amendment .... [Sensenbrenner] was floor
manager for opponents of the ERA.").
12. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 5.
13. Id.
14. Prior to 1983, the most recent committee legislative history focusing on the ERA's
substantive provisions was created when the Senate debated and reported the ERA out to the
states on March 22, 1972. See 118 CONG. REc. S9598 (1972).
15. Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST
Mar. 28, 2007, at AI.
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defeated. 16 Yet the issues they raised have not changed. Moreover, the
validity of the concerns raised by those who offered the amendments
can now be more fully tested against the backdrop of judicial decisions
handed down since 1983 by state courts interpreting the same text of
the ERA-with its prescription that "equality of rights" shall not be
denied on account of sex-as adopted as part of six state
constitutions. 7
This article uses a rough transcript 8 to explore several of the
amendments offered to the ERA during the 1983 House Judiciary
Committee markup and examines the concerns that motivated the
sponsors of those amendments, concerns that included the ERA's
effect on government-funded abortions, the military draft and combat
policies, same-sex marriage, insurance premiums, and private entities.
The article then explores whether those concerns were justified in light
of state court decisions interpreting the identical base text of the ERA
in the six states that adopted such a state-level ERA as part of their
own state constitutions. This article concludes that the concerns of
those who offered the amendments to the federal ERA were largely
justified and that such concerns remain legitimate regarding the most
16. At the 1983 House Judiciary Committee markup of the ERA, Representative Harold
Sawyer (R-Mich.) commented on the manner in which all amendments to the ERA were voted
down on party-line votes, stating "[t]he way it's being handled in the Committee, it's
disgusting. Even if the word 'equal' was misspelled, [ERA supporters] wouldn't change it."
1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 110.
17. Those states, and the relevant text of the ERA as enacted as part of their state
constitutions, are as follows: Colorado, COLO. CONST., art. II, § 29 ("Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political
subdivisions on account of sex."); Hawaii, HAW. CONST., art. I, § 3 ("Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex."); Maryland, MD.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged
or denied because of sex."); New Mexico, N.M. CONST.art. II, § 18 ("Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person."); Pennsylvania, PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."); and Washington,
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 ("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex.").
Other states have constitutional provisions that generally prohibit discrimination against
women, but they include all manner of qualifying language not contained in the text of the
proposed federal ERA. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (providing also that "mere separation
of the sexes shall not be considered discrimination"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (exempting
"bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of public employment, public education or public contracting"); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2
(providing that ERA "shall [not] be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion
or the funding thereof').
18. A copy of the proceedings of that 1983 debate, available only in the form of a rough
transcript compiled by congressional stenographers, was maintained by co-author Philip G.
Kiko, the Republican committee counsel to Representative Sensenbrenner at the time.
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recently proposed federal ERA, the language of which is identical to
H.J. Res. 1 from 1983.19
II. THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON GOVERNMENT-FUNDED ABORTIONS
The Hyde Amendment prohibits the use of federal funds for
abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or when the life of the mother
is endangered.20 The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment's
abortion funding restrictions as constitutional in Harris v. McRae.
21
Whether the Hyde Amendment would be struck down if the ERA
became part of the Constitution was the subject of extensive debate in
1983.
At the November 3, 1983 hearing on the ERA before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Yale law professor
Thomas Emerson, co-author of a seminal article on the ERA that
appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1971, 22 was asked by
Representative Mike DeWine, Republican from Ohio, if the Hyde
Amendment would withstand a court challenge under the ERA.
Professor Emerson responded that "[i]f [the Supreme Court is] going
to overrule the Harris case, [they] would do it by saying the Hyde
Amendment is a burden on the right of privacy. They wouldn't do it
under ERA., 23 Professor Ann Freedman, co-author of the same Yale
Law Journal article, agreed and said, "The Supreme Court analyzes
abortion cases as privacy cases .... If the Supreme Court were
inclined to overturn such a congressional decision as is represented by
the Hyde Amendment, they would do it on privacy grounds. 24 This
view was reiterated at the 1983 markup of the ERA by Representative
Edwards, the chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the
amendment. 25 Representative Patricia Schroeder at the time further
argued that cases decided under state-level ERA's had made clear the
19. See H.R.J.Res. 40, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing that "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee (2000) ("Funds provided to a State under this subchapter...
may include coverage of abortion only if necessary to save the life of the mother or if the
pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.").
21. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).
22. Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk &Ann E. Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871
(1971).
23. Equal Rights Amendment House Hearings, supra note 7, at 803.
24. Id. at 813.
25. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 39 ("[I]f the Supreme Court ever overturns
any abortion decision, it would be on privacy grounds, not on grounds of sex.").
2007] 345
346 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
ERA would not affect abortion decisions, stating that the case law
regarding abortion is predictable.26
Representative Sensenbrenner, however, requested that
Congress' independent research arm, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), provide the committee with its own evaluation of the
question. As he said at the 1983 markup of the ERA: "The executive
summary of the CRS report says that under strict scrutiny the
pregnancy classification [in the Hyde Amendment] would probably be
regarded to be a sex classification under the ERA., 27 Representative
DeWine also predicted that "the Hyde Amendment would have a very
difficult time under some federal judges surviving the ERA, unless
there was an abortion-neutral amendment included therein."
28
In the midst of the confusion regarding whether the Hyde
Amendment would survive passage of the ERA, Representative
Sensenbrenner offered an amendment to the ERA at the 1983 markup
that stated, "Nothing in this article shall be construed to grant or secure
any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof.,
29
Representative Edwards argued against the adoption of the
amendment, but evidently not against the policy it embodied, on the
grounds that "[w]e have accepted this amendment on our legislative
history. That is the appropriate way to elucidate it."30 Representative
Edwards also explicitly denied that the ERA would prohibit
classifications on pregnancy as an unconstitutional instance of sex
discrimination. He was asked at the 1983 markup by Representative
Hamilton Fish, Jr., the Ranking Republican on the Full House
Judiciary Committee from New York, "Under the language of the
proposed amendment before us, would the pregnancy classification
26. Id. at 43 ("[Y]ou look at the case law, which we have. You can look at it, it is not
unpredictable. We know what it will say.").
27. Id. at 32. The Congressional Research Service report elaborated that "[w]ith respect
to the first issue of standard of review, if strict scrutiny, the most active form of judicial
review, is the standard applied [under the ERA], then the answer to the question whether
pregnancy classifications are sex-based classifications would seem to be affirmative. It would
then follow that the ERA would reach abortion and abortion funding situations. It is very
difficult for the government to meet the burden of showing that the classification in question
serves a compelling state interest, thus, classifications subjected to active review are almost
always invalidated as being violative of the Constitution." Karen J. Lewis, A Legal Analysis of
the Potential Impact of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) on the Right to an
Abortion or to the Funding of an Abortion 61-62 (Congressional Research Service, Oct. 20,
1983).
28. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 22.
29. Id. at 35. The Sensenbrenner amendment was later amended to replace the words
"grant or secure" with "grant, secure, or deny." See id. at 42.
30. Id at 38.
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discrimination be based upon sex?",31 Representative Edwards replied,
"Well, it is a classification based on unique physical characteristics,
but not on gender or sex."
32
The Sensenbrenner amendment was subsequently rejected by
the committee by a vote of 12 to 19.33 But, as has been previously
mentioned, the legislative history to which Chairman Edwards referred
was never officially published as promised. Consequently, the ERA's
effect on the Hyde Amendment remained unclear when the ERA failed
to pass the House by the required two-thirds vote.
Today, however, with the benefit of more recent history, we
can see that the concerns of Representative Sensenbrenner and those
who supported his amendment proved to be justified. Five years later
in 1988, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Colorado's ERA34
prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. In Colorado Civil
Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co.,3 that court found as
follows:
The [Colorado Civil Rights] Commission urges that
pursuant to the Equal Rights Amendment"' Colo. Const.
art. 1, § 29... an employer discriminates on the basis
of sex by providing employees as part of a total
compensation package a group health insurance policy
providing coverage only for complications of
pregnancy and excluding from coverage expenses
incurred during a normal pregnancy. We agree ....
[B]ecause pregnancy is a condition unique to women,
an employer offers fewer benefits to female employees
on the basis of sex when it fails to provide them
insurance coverage for pregnancy while providing male
employees comprehensive coverage for all conditions,
including those conditions unique to men. This
disparity in the proyision of comprehensive insurance
benefits as a part of employment compensation
constitutes discriminatory conduct on the basis of
sex .... The failure to provide coverage for the
treatment of pregnancy in an otherwise comprehensive
insurance policy discriminates against women on the
31. Id. at30-31.
32. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 51.
34. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29.
35. 759 P.2d 1358 (Co. 1988).
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basis of sex as surely as, for example, the failure to
provide coverage for the treatment of prostate
conditions in a comprehensive policy would
discriminate against men on the basis of sex .... For
the foregoing reasons, we conclude that [the defendant]
discriminated on the basis of sex, in violation of the
requirements of the Equal Rights Amendment .... 36
Ten years later, in 1998, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
took the next step and relied on New Mexico's state-level ERA37 to
strike down a state regulation restricting state funding of abortions for
Medicaid-eligible women.
In New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,38 the court
found as follows:
Neither the Hyde Amendment nor the federal
authorities upholding the constitutionality of that
amendment bar this Court from affording greater
protection of the rights of Medicaid-eligible women
under our state constitution in this instance .... Article
II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution
guarantees that "[e]quality of rights under law shall not
be denied on account of the sex of any person."....
We construe the intent of this amendment as providing
something beyond that already afforded by the general
language of the Equal Protection Clause ....
[C]lassifications based on the unique ability of women
to become pregnant and bear children are not exempt
from a searching judicial inquiry under the Equal
Rights Amendment .... Except in the cases of rape or
incest, or when necessary to save the life of the mother,
[New Mexico's] Rule 766 denies state funding for
abortions even when they are medically necessary.
Under the [New Mexico Human Services]
Department's regulations, there is no comparable
restriction on medically necessary services relating to
physical characteristics or conditions that are unique to
36. Id. at 1361, 1363-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiff had sued
because the insurance policy would cover expenses for pregnancy complications, but not for
expenses related to a normal pregnancy. Id. at 1359-61.
37. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
38. 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998).
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men. Indeed, we can find no provision in the
Department's regulations that disfavors any
comparable, medically necessary procedure unique to
the male anatomy .... Thus, Rule 766 undoubtedly
singles out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked
condition that is unique to women .... We determine
that Rule 766 employs a gender-based classification
that operates to the disadvantage of women and is
therefore presumptively unconstitutional. In order to
survive the heightened scrutiny that we apply to such
classifications, the State must meet its burden of
showing that Rule 766 is supported by a compelling
justification .... The Department fails to offer a
sufficiently compelling justification for such
discrimination in this case.39
If, as the Colorado and New Mexico Supreme Courts have now
explained, classifications based on pregnancy constitute
unconstitutional sex discrimination under the ERA, then the reasoning
underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae,40 which
upheld the Hyde Amendment, would not be sustainable if the federal
ERA were adopted. In the Harris case, the Supreme Court noted that
"[w]hether freedom of choice [such as the choice of an abortion] that
is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a
question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional
entitlement,'A' and that it is rational for Congress to authorize federal
reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but not for
certain medically necessary abortions, because "[a]bortion is
inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other
procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.A
Those rationales would seem to necessarily break under the
stress of a federal ERA. That is because, under the reasoning
enunciated by the Colorado and New Mexico Supreme Courts, the
ERA, by prohibiting all discrimination based on sex, would indeed
"entitle" women to government subsidization of abortions in all
instances, if government subsidized medical procedures at all. To do
39. Id. at 851, 855-56.
40. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
41. Id. at318.
42. Id. at 325.
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otherwise would be to discriminate based on the ability to become
pregnant, and only women can become pregnant.43
Also, under the reasoning of the Colorado and New Mexico
Supreme Courts, presumably the same principles they articulated in
these state-level ERA cases would apply to strike down the federal ban
on partial-birth abortions" and also state laws providing for parental
consent or notification before a minor obtains an abortion, as such
abortions can only be sought by women, not men. Such laws, however,
are widely supported.46
43. The constitutional right to be protected from all sex discrimination under the ERA
would trump the "inherently different" nature of abortions because the ERA directs its
constitutional protections to those of a particular "sex," not to those in a particular state of
human development.
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
45. Such laws are in effect in twenty-seven states. See ALA. CODE §26-21-3 (1992).;
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-2152 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §20-16-801 (2005).; FLA. STAT.
§390.01114 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §15-11-112 (2005).; IND. CODE ANN. §§16-18-2-267, 16-
34-2-4 (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §135L.3 (2007).; KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-6705 (2005); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §311.732 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.35.5 (2001).; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. CH. 112, §12S (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.903 (2002).; MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§645.452, 144.343 (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §41-41-53 (2005).; Mo. REV. STAT.
§§188.015, 188.028 (2004) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §71-6902 (2003).; N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-21.7
(2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (2004); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § §2919.121-. 122 (2006);
OKL. STAT. ANN. tit.63, §§ 1-740.2-.3 (Supp. 2008); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§3203, 3206
(2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §23-4.7-6 to -7 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §34-23A-1, -7 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. §37-10-303 (2005).; TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §164.052 (2004); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-241 (Supp. 2007); and WYO. STAT. ANN. §§35-6-101,35-6-118 (2007).
46. Regarding partial-birth abortion, over 60% of registered voters favor a ban on
partial-birth abortion. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll (February 28-March 1, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/FOX221_abortion web.pdf. Seventy percent of adults
favor "a law which would make it illegal to perform a specific abortion procedure conducted
in the last six months of pregnancy known as a 'partial-birth abortion,' except in cases
necessary to save the life of the mother." CNN/USAToday/Gallup Poll (January 10-12, 2003),
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm.
Regarding parental involvement laws, one recent poll asked respondents "[w]ould you
favor or oppose requiring that at least one parent be told before a girl under 18 years of age
could have an abortion?" Eighty percent responded "Favor." CBS News Poll (July 13-14,
2005), available at http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. When asked "[d]o you think a
female under age 18 should be required by state law to notify at least one parent or guardian
before having an abortion?" 78% responded "Yes," including 64% of those who identified
themselves as "pro-choice." Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll (April 25-26, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/poll_042705.pdf. Also, one poll found that 69% of
American adults favor a law requiring women under 18 to get parental consent before
obtaining an abortion, see CNN/USAToday/Gallup Poll (November 11-13, 2005),
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/10071. Another poll found that 72% of registered
voters favor the same. See Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll (April 25-26, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/poll_042705.pdf.
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON THE MILITARY DRAFT AND COMBAT
POLICY
Another issue of concern to some at the 1983 markup of the
ERA was its impact on the military draft and combat policy. Currently,
women are permitted to serve on most combat ships and in combat
aviation. However, they are barred from assignment to units "below
the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat
on the ground.",4 7 In addition, the military can exclude women from
military positions "if (1) the units and positions [are] required to
physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units, (2)
the service secretary attests that the cost of providing appropriate
living space for women is prohibitive, (3) the units are engaged in
special operations missions, or (4) job-related physical requirements
would exclude the vast majority of women."'48
Because women are precluded from serving in the vast
majority of combat positions, only males are subject to conscription
pursuant to a military draft. In 1981, the Supreme Court, in Rostker v.
Goldberg,49 upheld as constitutional the provisions of the Military
Selective Service Act that authorized the President to require the
registration of males and not females for potential conscription.
The Court stated:
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group,
are not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the
participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air
Force are statutory. Under 10 U.S.C. § 6015, "women
may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft
that are engaged in combat missions," and under 10
U.S.C. § 8549 female members of the Air Force "may
not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat
missions." The Army and Marine Corps preclude the
use of women in combat as a matter of established
policy. Congress specifically recognized and endorsed
the exclusion of women from combat in exempting
women from registration.5 °
47. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: TRENDS IN THE OCCUPATIONAL
DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY WOMEN 3 (1999).
48. Id.
49. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
50. Id. at 76-77 (citations omitted).
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The Court so held, even though, as the dissent pointed out,
"military experts acknowledged that female conscripts can perform as
well as male conscripts in certain positions, and that there is therefore
no reason why one group should be totally excluded from registration
and a draft.
5
The Court concluded that there was no violation of the Due
Process Clause because
[t]he exemption of women from registration is not only
sufficiently but also closely related to Congress'
purpose in authorizing registration. The fact that
Congress and the Executive have decided that women
should not serve in combat fully justifies Congress in
not authorizing their registration, since the purpose of
registration is to develop a pool of potential combat
troops.52
In Goldberg, the Court felt constrained by Congress's explicit
recognition that the issues of registration and combat roles are closely
linked. The Senate Report accompanying the Military Selective
Service Act states that "the starting point for any discussion of the
appropriateness of registering women for the draft is the question of
the proper role of women in combat." 53 The Court itself recognized
that "[t]he purpose of registration... was to prepare for a draft of
combat troops."54 Were the ERA to require the registering of women,
it is therefore quite likely it would also require that women serve in
combat positions as well.
Concerned with such a result, Representative Harold Sawyer
offered an amendment to the ERA that provided "[N]othing in this
article shall be construed to affect any law, policy, or regulation
51. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
53. See S. Rep. No. 96-826, at 157 (1980) (quoted in Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 68).
54. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 76 (emphasis in original).
55. The Court in Goldberg made clear that "[n]one of this is to say that Congress is free
to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs." 453 U.S. at 67.
However, the ERA, were it to become part of the Constitution, would certainly govern
military registration and combat policies. As Representative Hall said at the 1983 House
Judiciary Committee markup of the ERA, "[o]nce the ERA becomes part of the Constitution,
the basis for the Supreme Court's [Goldberg decision] would be demolished." 1983 House
Transcript, supra note 1, at 107. Representative DeWine also commented, "[t]here was not a
single witness that we had in front of us in the [Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights] who did not agree that if the ERA was passed you are going to have women in combat
and you are going to have women who must be drafted." Id. at 132.
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relating to the utilization of persons in military combat."56
Representative Hyde, supporting the amendment, said, "I don't think
the American people are ready to have their daughters, their wives and
women put in the front lines in combat., 57 Representative Clay Shaw,
a Republican from Florida, also supported the Sawyer Amendment. He
cautioned opponents of the Sawyer amendment who relied on case law
as it existed at the time to determine the ERA's expected effect, stating
that the case law will not apply once the Constitution is amended.
Nevertheless, the Sawyer Amendment was defeated by a vote of 11 to
20.59
Representative Sam Hall, a Democrat from Texas who later
became a federal judge, offered a separate amendment that provided
"[N]othing in this article shall be construed to affect any law,
regulation, or policy relating to the draft for military service.
' 60
Representative Hyde, supporting the amendment, stated:
[T]oday Congress, the people's branch, the accountable
branch of government, has the option to call up women,
to call up men, to call them both up. When ERA gets
cranked into the Constitution, the elected branch of the
Government that should set and implement public
policy loses that option, loses that power. In the War
Powers Act we the Congress tell the President how
many days he can keep troops in combat. When ERA
becomes the law of the land, we turn to the courts
across the street, nine people appointed for life, and
they will tell us the makeup, the personnel, the
composition of those troops.
6 1
The Hall Amendment was defeated by a vote of 13 to 18.62
While state courts, of course, do not have jurisdiction to
address issues regarding U.S. conscription and military combat
policies, state courts do and have addressed issues related to the effect
of state-level ERA's on sex integration policies in public schools. The
56. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 85.
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id. at 94. ("[W]hen you are talking about existing case law, we have to quit using
that expression on this Committee, because the existing case law is going to be gone when you
amend the Constitution ... .
59. Id. at 102.
60. Id. at 103.
61. Id. at 132-33.
62. Id. at 138.
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principles that govern such policies will also inform decisions
regarding sex integration in other areas of government, including the
U.S. military.63
Even prior to 1983, the Pennsylvania and Washington state
courts, where state-level ERA's are identical to the proposed federal
constitutional amendment, had already held that their respective state
ERA's prohibited public schools from segregating boys and girls in
athletic events.
In Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n,64 the court held that Pennsylvania's state-level ERA65 on its
face overrode a bylaw of the State Interscholastic Athletic Association
that provided that girls could not compete or practice against boys in
any athletic contest.
The court stated:
The complaint here specifically challenges the
constitutionality of Article XIX, Section 3B of the
PIAA By-Laws which states: "Girls shall not compete
or practice against boys in any athletic contest"....
Article XIX, Section 3B of the PIAA By-Laws is
unconstitutional on its face under the [Pennsylvania]
ERA and none of the justifications for it offered by the
PIAA, even if proved, could sustain its legality. We
need not, therefore, consider whether or not the By-Law
also violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution .... There is no fundamental right
to engage in interscholastic sports, but once the state
decides to permit such participation, it must do so on a
basis which does not discriminate in violation of the
constitution .... Moreover, even where separate teams
are offered for boys and girls in the same sport, the
most talented girls still may be denied the right to play
at that level of competition which their ability might
otherwise permit them. For a girl in that position, who
63. This connection was recognized by at least one witness who testified in support of
the ERA in 1983. At the November 3, 1983 hearing on the ERA before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Professor Ann Freedman testified that
"[i]mportant areas in which the ERA would dictate different results... are sex discrimination
in the military and sex segregation in public schools." Equal Rights Amendment House
Hearings, supra note 7, at 777 (emphasis added).
64. 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. 1975).
65. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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has been relegated to the "girls' team", solely because
of her sex, "equality under the law" has been denied.66
In the case itself, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which
was pressing the sex integration claim, was apparently uncomfortable
with the notion that boys and girls should be required to compete in
the more physical sports of football and wrestling, as its complaint
specifically exempted those sports from the purview of the lawsuit.
67
Regardless, the court found that there was no justification for
exempting those sports from the ruling.
68
Yet, well beyond football and wrestling, the reasoning the
Pennsylvania court applied could be applied near seamlessly at the
federal level to require, when there is a draft, the drafting of women
into military combat roles under a federal ERA. As the Pennsylvania
court stated:
The notion that girls as a whole are weaker and thus
more injury-prone, if they compete with boys,
especially in contact sports, cannot justify the By-Law
in light of the ERA. Nor can we consider the argument
that boys are generally more skilled. The existence of
certain characteristics to a greater degree in one sex
does not justify classification by sex rather than by the
particular characteristic. If any individual girl is too
weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may, of course, be
excluded from competition on that basis but she cannot
be excluded solely because of her sex without regard to
her relevant qualifications.
69
66. Pennsylvania lnsterscholastic Athletic Ass "n, 334 A.2d at 840-42.
67. See id. at 841 n.2.
68. Id. at 843 (finding that "[a]lthough the Commonwealth in its complaint seeks no
relief from discrimination against female athletes who may wish to participate in football and
wrestling, it is apparent that there can be no valid reason for excepting those two sports from
our order in this case."). Judge Bowman, writing a strongly worded dissent in the case, stated
that "it is inescapable in my view that the majority has extruded prior decisions of our
Supreme Court to the absonant conclusion that under no circumstances and under no
conditions ... can there be a rational basis for distinction or classification as between the
sexes, a view not shared even by the plaintiff in this cause of action in excluding the 'contact
sports' of football and wrestling from the purview of the relief sought." Id. (Bowman,
Presiding J., dissenting).
69. Id. (citations omitted).
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Washington courts apply the same reasoning under their own
state-level ERA. In Darrin v. Gould,7 ° the Washington Supreme Court
held that under its state-level ERA,7' public high schools in the state
could not deny qualified high school students permission to play on
the high school football team in interscholastic competition solely on
the ground that the students were girls.
The court reasoned:
The question is whether a school district operating a
high school in this state may constitutionally deny two
of its fully qualified high school students permission to
play on the high school football team in interscholastic
competition solely on the ground the students are girls.
We hold the denial a prohibited discrimination based on
sex and reverse .... Whatever may have been the
former law, when [the plaintiffs] in the fall of 1973
were denied permission to play on the high school
football team, Washington's [state-level ERA]
expressly forbade discrimination based on sex ....
[The Washington state ERA] added something to the
prior prevailing law by eliminating otherwise
permissible sex discrimination if the rational
relationship or strict scrutiny tests were met .... Any
other view would mean the people intended to
accomplish no change in the existing constitutional law
governing sex discrimination .... Had such a limited
purpose been intended, there would have been no
necessity to resort to the broad, sweeping, mandatory
language of the Equal Rights Amendment. 72
Since 1983, similar reasoning has already subsequently
appeared in the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Virginia,73 which
70. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
71. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
72. Gould, 540 P.2d at 883-85, 889 (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion, Judge
Hamilton noted that this result may well not have been anticipated by those who enacted the
state-level ERA. Id. at 893 (Hamilton, J., concurring) ("With some qualms I concur in the
result reached by the majority. I do so, however, exclusively upon the basis that the result is
dictated by the broad and mandatory language of ... Washington's Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). Whether the people in enacting the ERA fully contemplated and appreciated the result
here reached, coupled with its prospective variations, may be questionable. Nevertheless, in
sweeping language they embedded the principle of the ERA in our constitution, and it is
beyond the authority of this court to modify the people's will.").
73. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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struck down the male-only admission policy at the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), in which the Court stated "[n]either the goal of
producing citizen-soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is
inherently unsuitable to women."
74
In that case, the Court noted that "it is uncontested that
women's admission would require accommodations, primarily in
arranging housing assignments and physical training programs for
female cadets," and that "[t]he parties ... agree that some women can
meet the physical standards [VMI] now impose[s] on men." 75
Nevertheless, the Court stated that "generalizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no
longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description." 7
6
The majority opinion in U.S. v. Virginia, it should be noted,
was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was
intimately involved in the preparation of a report published by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1977 that advocated the
elimination of sex discrimination in the U.S. Code.77 The report
specifically supported the federal ERA78 and recommended the
elimination of "sex-discriminatory provisions in the Code, 79 that
contain "either substantive sex-based differentials or terminology
inconsistent with a national commitment to equal rights,
responsibilities, and opportunities (the equal rights principle), 80
74. Id. at 520.
75. Id. at 540-41 (quotations and emphasis omitted).
76. Id. at 550 (emphasis in original).
77. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE: A REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1977) [hereinafter SEX BIAS IN THE U.S.
CODE]. That report was transmitted to the President, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House, in a letter that stated "[a]s some members of Congress are probably
aware, the initial research and draft of this report was developed by contractors, Ruth Bader
Ginsberg and Brenda Feigan Fasteau, assisted by a group of Columbia Law School students."
Id at iii. The acknowledgements preceding the report state: "[a] report prepared under contract
no. CR3AK010 by Brenda Feigan-Fasteau, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and 15 students from the
Columbia Law School, New York City was used as the basis for the Commission study. Ms.
Ginsburg is professor of law at the Columbia Law School." Id. at v. The report's letter of
transmittal counseled that "[o]ur study... is a guide to you and to the Justice Department for
action in erasing sex-based references and sex bias from our most basic laws." Id. at iii.
78. See id. at 5 ("The equal rights amendment (ERA) has been proposed as a measure to
ensure constitutional protection against all legislative sex discrimination.").
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 13.
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including provisions exempting women from the draft8 l and from
military combat.
8 2
The report's analysis states:
Debate over the equal rights amendment (ERA) makes
it clear that proponents envisioned no exemption for the
Armed Forces from the principle of equal rights,
responsibilities, and opportunity .... As is indicated in
the legislative history of the equal rights amendment,
the principle of equal rights, responsibilities, and
opportunity as applied to the Armed Forces calls for
assignment of men and women on the basis of
individual capacity in light of the needs of the services.
The principle does not permit formulation of personnel
utilization policy on the basis of sex. Instead, strictly
job-related standards, including tests of strength and
skill where relevant, would determine placement of
personnel .... Implementation of the equal rights
principle requires a unitary system of appointment,
assignment, promotion, discharge, and retirement, a
system that cannot be founded on a combat exclusion
for women .... [A]mendments to the current laws must
81. Id. at 19. The seminal article on the ERA published in the Yale Law Journal in 1971
similarly argues that:
"[t]he Armed Forces have always been one of the most male-dominated
institutions in our society. Only men are subject to involuntary
conscription. . . . Until women are required to serve in substantial
numbers, stereotypes about their inability to do so will be perpetuated. The
Equal Rights Amendment will have a substantial and pervasive impact
upon military practices and institutions. As now formulated, the
Amendment permits no exceptions for the military. Neither the right to
privacy nor any unique physical characteristic justifies different treatment
of the sexes with respect to voluntary or involuntary service .... These
changes will require a radical restructuring of the military's view of
women .... Under the Equal Rights Amendment the draft law will not be
invalidated. Recognizing the concern of Congress with maintaining the
Armed Forces, courts would construe the Amendment to excise the word
"male" from the two main sections of the [Military Selective Service] Act,
dealing with registration and induction, thereby subjecting all citizens to
these duties. A woman will register for the draft at the age of eighteen, as
a man now does. She will then be classified as to availability for induction
and training. If she meets the physical and mental standards, and is not
eligible for any exemptions or deferments, she will join men in
susceptibility to induction."
Brown, supra note 22, at 967, 969-71 (1971).
82. SEx BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE, supra note 77, at 25, 26.
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include... [e]qual opportunities and requirements for
enlistment.., and in relation to any draft.8
3
The report also supports the elimination of the terms "fraternity
and sorority chapters" 84 and the sex-integration of the Boy Scouts and
the Girl Scouts.8?
Were the federal ERA to become part of the Constitution, then,
there would seem little doubt that Justice Ginsburg, the author of the
decision in U.S. v. Virginia, would find that it requires that any draft
also include women, and that they serve in combat roles.
At least one poll indicates there is popular support for allowing
women to serve in combat roles,86 but current popular support for the
drafting of women into combat positions remains unclear. Some at the
1983 House markup of the ERA cautioned that enactment of the
federal ERA, by requiring the drafting of women into combat
positions, would result in a situation in which women (who constitute
a majority of the electorate) would be constitutionally denied the
opportunity to decide on whether they should be drafted into combat.8
7
By the same argument, under the ERA, women would also be denied
the opportunity to vote for legislation that might refine the manner in
83. Id. at 25-26, 32.
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 145-46, 219-20. The report found that "[t]he Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts,
while ostensibly providing 'separate but equal' benefits to both sexes, perpetuate stereotyped
sex roles to the extent that they carry out congressionally-mandated purposes." Id. at 145-146.
86. A USA Today/Gallup Poll of 1,028 adults nationwide, conducted September 7-8,
2007, found that 74% of those surveyed believed women should be allowed to hold combat
jobs in the U.S. armed forces. USA Today/Gallup Poll (Sept. 7-8, 2007), available at
www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm. Much different results followed a 1980 Gallup poll in
which only 22% of those surveyed supported women serving in combat roles. See MARTIN
BINKIN, WHO WILL FIGHT THE NEXT WAR? THE CHANGING FACE OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
48 (1993). However, the 2007 Gallup Poll did not ask respondents whether they supported the
drafting of women into combat roles. USA Today/Gallup Poll (Sept. 7-8, 2007), available at
www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm.
87. Representative Carlos Moorhead, a Republican from California, at the 1983 House
Judiciary markup of the ERA, said "I have great confidences in [women's] abilities in every
way, shape, or form, but I don't want to force those women into the service, or force those
women into combat... that want to raise their families .... I think society is better served by
giving them that freedom of choice rather than letting a few who are militant on this subject
say, grab them all ...." 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 97. Representative Hyde also
stated that "today Congress, the people's branch, the accountable branch of government, has
the option to call up women [for military service], to call up men, to call them both up. When
ERA gets cranked into the Constitution, the elected branch of the Government that should set
and implement public policy loses that option, loses that power." Id. at 132.
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which women are utilized in combat roles, should such refinements be
deemed necessary in light of subsequent experience.
88
1V. THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
Although the issue of same-sex marriage was not the subject of
an amendment offered to the ERA at the 1983 House Judiciary
Committee markup, the prospect of the ERA's requirement of same-
sex marriage was the subject of some discussion at the hearings held
on the ERA just prior to the markup.
At the October 20, 1983 hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, former
Representative and federal judge Charles Wiggins said that if the ERA
were adopted "[b]ecause private litigants select the factual setting in
which issues are framed, we truly cannot discount the bizarre cases.
For example, it is not unthinkable that the question of... [1]itigation
involving homosexual marriages, may not be thrust upon the courts by
ingenious private litigants pursuing their own interests." 89 At the same
hearing, Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle Forum asked "Would ERA
prohibit [states] from denying marriage licenses to homosexuals and
lesbians .... T'90
Those questions were answered in 1993 by the Hawaii
Supreme Court, which relied on Hawaii's state-level ERA91 to strike
down Hawaii's law that granted marriage licenses to only couples
88. Kingsley Browne, who recently published a book on the subject of women's serving
in combat roles, has summarized his conclusions regarding existing research on the issue as
follows: "I argue that those who believe there are no substantial tradeoffs involved in
including women in combat roles are wrong. Inclusion of women in those roles results in a
segment of the force that is physically weaker, more prone to injury (both physical and
psychological), less physically aggressive, able to withstand less pain, less willing to take
physical risks, less motivated to kill, less likely to be available to deploy when ordered to
(partly, but not exclusively because of pregnancy), more expensive to recruit, and less likely to
remain in the service even for the length of their initial contracts. Officers and NCOs [non-
commissioned officers] must reassign physical tasks (or do them themselves) because women
cannot get them done fast enough, if at all. The fact that women, in general, are less effective
warriors is only part of the problem. The more fundamental problem comes from the mixing
of men and women in combat forces .... Women frequently are placed in units with men who
do not trust the women with their lives and who do not bond with women the way that they do
with other men." Posting of Kingsley Browne to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_200712_02-200712_08.shtml#1 196697012 (Dec. 3,
2007, 10:50am); also see generally Kingsley Browne, Co-Ed Combat: The New Evidence that
Women Shouldn't Fight the Nation's Wars (2007).
89. Equal Rights Amendment House Hearings, supra note 7, at 351.
90. Id. at 392.
91. HAW. CONST.,art. I, § 3.
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consisting of one man and one woman. In Baehr v. Lewin,92 the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that Hawaii's law restricting marriage
licenses to opposite sex couples "on its face and as applied, regulates
access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on
the basis of the applicants' sex. As such, [it] establishes a sex-based
classification."
93
The court based its holding on Hawaii's ERA, stating that "[i]n
light of. . . the presence of article I, section 3-the Equal Rights
Amendment-in the Hawaii Constitution .... we hold that sex is a
'suspect category' for purposes of equal protection analysis under
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and that [Hawaii's
marriage law] is subject to the 'strict scrutiny' test,"'94 which, upon
remand, the state law was determined not to have met.
95
Also worth noting is that Massachusetts' state-level ERA is
very similar to that in effect in Hawaii. Massachusetts' ERA provides,
"Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of
,96 9sex...." In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,97  a
concurring Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied
on Massachusetts' ERA, and cited the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision in Baehr, in holding that traditional marriage restricted to
unions between one man and one woman is unconstitutional. In that
case, concurring Justice Greany stated:
Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights, as amended by
art. 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution, provides: "... Equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race,
color, creed or national origin.".... The withholding
of relief from the plaintiffs, who wish to marry, and are
otherwise eligible to marry, on the ground that the
couples are of the same gender, constitutes a categorical
92. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
93. Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 67.
95. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3,
1996) (stating "the court specifically finds and concludes, as a matter of law, that Defendant
has failed to sustain his burden to overcome the presumption that [Hawaii's marriage law] is
unconstitutional by demonstrating or proving that the statute furthers a compelling state
interest"), affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
96. Mass. CONST. Part I, art. I. As such, it differs from Hawaii's ERA at supra note 91,
and that of the other states whose ERA's contain language identical to that of the federal ERA
only in that Massachusetts' ERA omits the words "of rights" after "equality."
97. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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restriction of a fundamental right. The restriction
creates a straightforward case of discrimination that
disqualifies an entire group of our citizens and their
families from participation in an institution of
paramount legal and social importance. This is
impermissible under art. 1 .... Because our marriage
statutes intend, and state, the ordinary understanding
that marriage under our law consists only of a union
between a man and a woman, they create a statutory
classification based on the sex of the two people who
wish to marry. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 564,
852 P.2d 44 (1993) (plurality opinion) (Hawaii
marriage statutes created sex-based classification) ....
[W]hen an individual desires to marry, but cannot
marry his or her chosen partner because of the
traditional opposite-sex restriction, a violation of art. 1
has occurred.
98
Judge Greaney's concurrence, it should be noted, was the
essential vote securing the court's 4-3 decision that struck down
traditional marriage in Massachusetts.
Polls nationwide show that the issue of same-sex marriage
remains controversial, and opposition to same-sex marriage ranges
between 56%99 and 63%.1' Yet these cases in Hawaii and
Massachusetts demonstrate that the recognition of same-sex marriages
may well be required under a federal ERA, rendering invalid statutes
and constitutional amendments in place in the vast majority of states
and at the federal level.''
98. Id. at 970-71 (Greaney, J., concurring).
99. Gallup Poll, May 8-11, 2006, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/
Homosexual-Relations.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
100. Quinnipiac University Poll, Nov. 13-19, 2006, available at http://www.
pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
101. As of this writing only Massachusetts recognizes same-sex marriage, and that was
the result of a judicial ruling. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
The following states recognize marriage as only a union between one man and one woman,
under either state statutes or under state constitutional provisions: Alabama, ALA. CODE.
amend. 774 (2005); Alaska, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (2006); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-101 (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 (2007); California, CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308.5 (2004); Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (2007); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. Ch. 815e §§ 46b-20-46b-38h (2007); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. title 13, § 101 (1999);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (2005); Georgia, GA CONST. art. I, § 4 (2007); Hawaii,
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (2005); Idaho, IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (2007); Illinois, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/212 (1999); Indiana, IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2007); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 595.2 (2001); Kansas, KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (2006); Kentucky, KY. CONST., § 233A
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V. THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON INSURANCE RATES
The impact of the ERA on insurance pricing also concerned
some Members of the House Judiciary Committee at the 1983 markup
of the ERA. Insurance is a mechanism for distributing the risk of loss
in which the insurer agrees to assume the insured's risk in exchange
for a premium paid by the insured. Premiums are usually based on
statistical aggregates such that certain classes of people who are at a
higher risk of loss tend to pay higher premiums, and those who are at a
lower risk of loss tend to pay lower premiums. For example, insurers
often determine that young women should pay lower premiums for
auto insurance than young men because they pose less risk on the
road. 02 One state, California, even requires the use of gender-specific
tables for life insurance and annuities, 03 which is designed to ensure
that women buying life insurance receive the full benefit of their
greater life expectancies.
The Supreme Court has upheld discrimination based on sex, as
a constitutional matter, in the context of insurance programs provided
the discrimination is motivated by a non-invidious intent. In Geduldig
v. Aiello,104 the Court stated that
(2006); Louisiana, LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (2008); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XIX-A,
§ 701 (1998); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2006); Michigan, MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 25 (2007); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (2006); Mississippi, Miss. CONST.
art. XIV, § 263A (2005); Missouri, MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (2008); Montana, MONT. CONST.
art. XIII, § 7 (2007); Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (2006); Nevada, NEV. CONST. art. I, §
21 (2005); New Hampshire, N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-2 (2007); New Jersey, N. J.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (2002); North Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (2007); North
Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (2007); Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (2004);
Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35 (2008); Oregon, OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (2007);
Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (2001); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-
1-1 to -2 (1996); South Carolina, S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (2007); South Dakota, S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (2007); Tennessee, TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (2007); Texas, TEx.
CONST. art. I, § 32 (2007); Utah, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (2007); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 8 (2002); Virginia, VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (2007); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.010 (2005); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2004); Wisconsin, Wis. CONST.
Art. XIII, § 13 (2007); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2007).
Also, the federal Defense of Marriage Act provides that only marriages that are a union
of one man and one woman shall be recognized under federal law. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)
("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.").
102. See Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What's
Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1652, 1661 n.95 (1995).
103. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f).
104. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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"While it is true that only women can become pregnant,
it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification ....
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the
other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation
such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect
to any other physical condition."'
0 5
In that case, the Court found that the insurer's discrimination
based on sex was not invidious discrimination against women because
it was employed as a cost containment measure. 106
Concerned that such precedents-and the principle that
market-based insurance rates based on gender classifications
generally-might be overturned by the ERA, Representative Sawyer
offered an amendment to the ERA at the 1983 House Judiciary
Committee markup that stated "Nothing in this article shall be
construed to deny insurors the right to consider a person's sex in the
establishment of insurance rates or benefits." 07 Representative
Edwards argued against the amendment, on the belief that insurance is
"a very complicated subject" and, therefore, should not be mentioned
in the Constitution.' °8 Representative John Seiberling, a Democrat
from Ohio, argued that the ERA, if adopted, would not affect
insurance rates, stating, "if, in fact, it is found that women as a group
105. Id. at 496-97 n.20. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136
(1976) (reaffirming that Gedulig held that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits
plan otherwise providing general coverage is not gender-based discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment). In response to the Gilbert decision, Congress subsequently amended
Title VII to, in some instances, statutorily "prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy" in passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978).
106. Gedulig, 417 U.S. at 495 ("It is evident that a totally comprehensive program would
be substantially more costly than the present program .... ").
107. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 77. Representative Sawyer, in arguing for his
amendment, stated "I am offering this amendment in that Michigan is one of four states that
tried, and has ... a unisex insurance law prohibiting a discrimination by reason of sex ....
The result has been an unmitigated disaster as far as women are concerned. To give you an
example of what has happened, since women, despite the common conception, are much safer
drivers than many drivers and men ... , the rates for young single women for automobile
insurance increased between 13 percent and 127 percent as a result of the enactment of that
law .... It's a very unfair situation for women to be put through that. Insurance companies
calculate their rates not on social things, they calculate them on actuarial statistics .... It's not
a question of discrimination, it's a question of actuarially setting rates." Id. at 77-78.
108. Id. at 79-80.
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have longer life or less accident rates [than men], that could be a valid
distinction, even under this [amendment].",°9
Representative Sensenbrenner supported Representative
Sawyer's amendment, stating, "Unless the Sawyer Amendment is
adopted, we will be constitutionalizing classic occasions for
insurance."" 0 Also, Representative Hyde argued that, if the ERA were
adopted, "insurance rates will become a constitutional question,
because it affects gender. . . ."',ll Representative Sawyer's amendment
was rejected by voice vote.' 12
Just a year after the 1983 House Judiciary Committee hearings
on the ERA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,113 held that, in light of
the Pennsylvania ERA's clear and unqualified prohibition of
discrimination under the law based upon gender, it was valid for the
state insurance commissioner to disapprove of an automobile insurer's
discriminatory gender-based rates on the ground they were unfair.
The court stated:
[The plantiff] established at an evidentiary hearing that,
as a twenty-six year old unmarried male with an
unblemished driving record, he was obligated to pay
One Hundred Forty-eight Dollars ($148) more in
annual premiums than would a similarly situated female
insured for identical coverage. [The defendant] sought
to justify its rating plan on the ground that actuarial data
indicated that male policyholders in [the plaintiffs] age
group are more likely to incur accident losses than
female policyholders in the same age group. The
Commissioner, interpreting the Rate Act's prohibition
of "unfairly discriminatory" rates in light of this
Commonwealth's public policy against sex
discrimination as embodied in the Equal Rights
Amendment, concluded that Hartford's gender-based
rates were "unfairly discriminatory" and therefore
invalid .... The Commissioner concluded that he was
compelled to interpret the statutory prohibition against
"unfairly discriminatory" rates in a manner consistent
109. Id. at 82-83.
110. Id. at 83.
111. Id. at 81.
112. Id. at 84-85.
113. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
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with the strong public policy against gender-based
discrimination under law as expressed in
Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment .... [I]t was
appropriate for the Commissioner to look beyond
actuarial statistics in evaluating the fairness of [the
defendant's] discriminatory rates. Since those rates
were based on the gender of the insured, the Equal
Rights Amendment was necessarily relevant .... The
Commissioner, as a public official charged with the
execution of the Rate Act and sworn to uphold the
Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth, was
constrained to conform his analysis of Hartford's rate
plan and his interpretation of... the Rate Act to
[Pennsylvania's ERA]." 14
Concurring and dissenting judges in the case went out of their
way to express varying degrees of dismay with what the state-level
ERA required. Judge Flaherty, stated in his concurring opinion that
"[he wrote] separately to emphasize that, were it not for the Equal
Rights Amendment,... resort to gender-based insurance rate
classifications would not be 'unfairly discriminatory' under [the Rate
Act], since such classifications may indeed be actuarily sound."'' 15
Judge Hutchinson, also concurring, stated:
No causal connection is shown on this record. What
does appear is only a statistical correlation between sex
and the incidence of auto accidents. This correlation
simply provides a convenient measuring rod for setting
rate differentials occasioned by other factors not so
easily identified or quantified. Such considerations of
convenience are not enough to stand in the face of our
ERA .... [W]ithout the Pennsylvania ERA, or some
other affirmative statement of legislative policy, the
Insurance Commissioner would lack the authority to
redefine the statutory phrase 'unfairly discriminatory'
in the face of the insurance industry's long standing
114. Id. at 544, 546-547, 549 (citations omitted). The reasoning of the court in that case
consequently runs contrary to that employed by the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (stating that "[a]bsent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis ... .
115. Hartford Accident, 482 A.2d at 550 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
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practice of utilizing gender based rate differentials. We
are obligated to affirm his action only because the ERA
objectively demonstrates, in the most forceful possible
way, the feeling of the people of this state that sex
discrimination is unfair.'
Judge McDermott, in dissent, stated:
Young women drivers, for actuarial purposes, have
hitherto constituted a class .... Insurance premiums
were computed according to their actuarial experience
as a class: being less accident prone, they received the
concomitant benefit of lower premiums .... In this
case, [the defendant] presented evidence showing that
there was a direct relationship between the higher rate
charged to young men and the risk young men pose on
the highway. Undisputed statistical evidence revealed
that young males are more likely to be involved in
automobile accidents than similarly situated female
drivers. For example, in the 25-29 age group, there
were 7.28 accidents per one hundred licensed male
drivers in Pennsylvania compared to only 2.96
accidents per one hundred licensed females. The
average loss for insured vehicles also evidences the
disparity: In the 17-20 age group, unmarried females
experience an average loss of $195, while similarly
116. Id. at 550-51 (Hutchinson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Judge McDermott, in
dissent, pointed out that the court's decision contradicted the intent of the Pennsylvania
legislature, remarking that:
[I]t is significant that the Legislature, following the passage of the Equal
Rights Amendment in 1971, had the opportunity on two occasions to
outlaw the usage of gender-based classifications in insurance rates but
specifically chose not to do so. In 1974, the Legislature revised the Unfair
Insurance Practices Act, prohibiting discrimination based on sex. But the
prohibition did not extend to the setting of rates "if made or promulgated
in accordance with the appropriate rate regulatory act." The 1974, No-
Fault Act also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, but
specifically exempted rate promulgation from that prohibition. The No-
Fault Act was repealed by the Legislature this year and was replaced with
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law which does not contain
an anti-discrimination section. We note also that the Commissioner
adjudicated this case in the face of an Insurance Commission regulation
which prohibits insurers from denying benefits or coverage on the basis of
sex, but specifically, "does not prohibit insurers from differentiating in
premium rates between sexes where there is sound actuarial justification."
Id. at 554 (McDermott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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situated males show an average loss of $255. Given
these facts, the use of gender in classifying insurance
rates was actuarially sound and not unfair or
unreasonable. " 17
Ironically, one of the most prominent organizations supporting
the federal ERA, the National Organization for Women (NOW),11 8
came to regret its own requirements of unisex insurance rates, and it
went so far as to file a lawsuit, unsuccessfully, to reverse the
Pennsylvania courts' determination that the Pennsylvania ERA
requires unisex rates. In Bartholomew v. Foster,119 the court found
that, under the Pennsylvania ERA, any insurance rates based on gender
are unconstitutional except those "reasonably and genuinely based on
physical characteristics unique to one sex,' 120 and that "[t]he ability to
operate a motor vehicle is not a physical characteristic uniquely related
117. Id. at 551, 553 (McDermott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Judge McDermott
also pointed out how prohibiting the use of gender classifications was unfair to women, stating
that "Indeed, to exclude the use of gender in the classification of automobile insurance rates
violates the intended definition of "unfairly discriminatory" . . . and unfairly treats as alike
those who are, at least on the highways, demonstratively different. This will translate into
excessive rates for young women and inadequate rates for young men who, according to
actuaries, pose a far greater insurance risk." Id. at 553. Judge Zappala, also in dissent, stated:
If the insurance rates here had been determined without reference to the
projected loss experience of male and female drivers, the rates would be
unfairly discriminatory. It is not unfairly discriminatory, however, to treat
individuals who are not in the same position differently. It is self-defeating
to suggest that similar individuals should be treated as such not only where
differences do not exist, but also that they should be treated as the same
where differences undeniably do exist. We are presented here with
differences which exist, not those which are presumed or manufactured to
reinforce social prejudices. By treating a class without reference to the
actual characteristics of the class, the majority in fact adopts the
discriminatory analysis which it has previously abhorred.
Id. at 557 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
118. The National Organization for Women had consistently opposed attempts to amend
the federal ERA in any way, arguing that existing case law in states with identically worded
ERA's was indication enough regarding how a federal ERA would be interpreted. When Judy
Goldsmith, the president of the organization, appeared on the ABC News program "This
Week with David Brinkley," she said the following: "We've thought about it [accepting
amendments to the ERA] a number of times, and always rejected the possibility .... [T]he
reality is that there is [sic] constitutional and legal principles that can help us to determine in
advance what the outcome is likely to be on that whole range of questions, and beyond that,
there are 16 state ERAs that have been in effect laboratory situations for testing what the effect
of the [federal] ERA will be. Many of them are worded exactly the same as the federal ERA,
and none of those terrible things [opponents have predicted] have occurred in those states."
This Week with David Brinkley ABC-TV, (ABC television broadcast July 13, 1983).
119. 541 A.2d 393 (Pa. 1988).
120. Id. at 397.
[VOL. 7:2
LOST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
to one's sex."' 12 1 Just two months after that decision, NOW brought
suit in NOW v. Commonwealth,122 alleging that the number of miles
driven by an insured should be taken into account by an insurer when
setting rates, because if such miles were not taken into account, the
effect was to hurt female drivers, who tended to drive fewer miles and
who should consequently be charged lower insurance premiums. But
the court upheld the ruling of the insurance commissioner and let the
challenged rate structure stand. 123 As one commentator has pointed
out, "The significant changes in insurance rates wrought by the ERA
[in Pennsylvania] have thus had the unexpected effect of benefiting
men more than women."
124
Judges in Washington and Maryland, both states with state-
level ERA's nearly identical to the federal ERA, have also found that
it requires the elimination of insurance pricing that discriminates based
on sex.
125
VI. STATE ACTION AND THE ERA's APPLICATION TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
At the 1983 House Judiciary Committee markup of the ERA,
Representative Dan Lungren, a Republican from California, offered an
amendment to the proposal that provided "Nothing in this Article shall
be construed to relate to private ... educational institutions."'
' 26
Representative Lungren offered that amendment in part because he
121. Id. (concluding that "we must declare that sex-based gender classifications
pertaining to insurance rates are unconstitutional").
122. 551 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 1988).
123. Id. at 1167 ("[W]e find that the [Insurance] Commissioner correctly concluded that
the insurers' practice of charging a uniform rate as between men and women did not violate the
ERA.").
124. PHYLLIS W. BECK AND PATRICIA A. DALY, Prohibition Against Denial or
Abridgment of Equality of Rights Because of Sex, in THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A
TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 726 (Ken Gormley et al. eds., 2004).
125. See Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (Wash. 2000) ("I concur with the views
expressed by Justice Sanders in the majority opinion he has crafted for the court. I write
separately simply to indicate that, in my view, another and more powerful source of public
policy against sex discrimination can be found in this state's Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA).") (Alexander, J., concurring); Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Insurance Company, 588
A.2d 760, 771 (Md. 1991) ("Article 46 of The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that
'[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.' Although
this constitutional provision may not directly apply to private employers, it nonetheless
establishes a public policy in Maryland that an individual should not be subjected to sex-based
discrimination.") (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 139.
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was concerned that the state action doctrine 127 could be used to impose
the ERA's requirements on even private schools that receive some
public funds. Representative Lungren stated:
It seems to me that the impact of the [ERA] on private
educational institutions warrants serious scrutiny. The
expansion of the State action doctrine with respect to
racial classifications under the 14th amendment is a
possible foreshadowing of its applicability to gender-
based classifications. 128 It must be remembered that
proponents of the [ERA] have argued that [proposition]
to obtain the same protection afforded by the courts
with respect to racial-based classifications. Dr. Dona
Shalala, the president of Hunter College, was selected
by ERA proponents to testify at the Senate hearings
December 13, 1983 on the impact of the ERA upon
private.., education. She testified, "I do not know of
any institution in the country in which there is not
public involvement."'
29
Representative Edwards opposed the amendment because he
believed that both the legislative history and the committee report
would address those issues.' Just a year after the 1983 House
Judiciary Committee debate, however, Representative Lungren's
concern that the ERA would be interpreted to apply to private entities
was validated by the Pennsylvania courts, whose analysis of the
Pennsylvania ERA went well beyond traditional state action doctrine.
In 1985, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Welsch v. Aetna
Insurance Co.,131 held that the Pennsylvania ERA's reach extended to
a sex discrimination claim brought by males directly against their
private automobile insurance companies 132 on the grounds that "all
127. "State action" is defined as "anything done by a government; esp., in constitutional
law, an intrusion on a person's rights (esp. civil rights) either by a governmental entity or by a
private requirement that can be enforced only by governmental action .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1444 (8th ed. 2004).
128. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 139. The reference here is to a line of cases
in which the Supreme Court has stated that classifications based on race must be viewed in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was created to eliminate race discrimination arising
from state actions. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
129. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 139-40.
130. Id. at 145. Again, however, neither the 1983 markup transcript nor any committee
report accompanying the ERA was ever published.




state and local government entities and officials [including state
insurance regulators that regulate private insurers] are bound by the
prohibition against sex discrimination embodied in the ERA in their
formulation, interpretation, and enforcement of regulations,
ordinances, and statutory as well as decisional law."'133 That decision,
according to one leading commentator, "suggest[s] that Pennsylvania
ERA protections against gender discrimination are greater than those
protections typically provided in federal cases requiring state
action."'
34
Even more recently, two federal district courts have interpreted
Pennsylvania state court decisions as extending the reach of
Pennsylvania's ERA to purely private actors. In Imboden v. Chowns
Communications,135 a federal district court, relying on Welsch, refused
to dismiss a sex discrimination claim against a private employer,
holding that the argument that Pennsylvania's ERA did not extend to
private actors was without merit. 136 And in Barrett v. Greater Hatboro
Chamber of Commerce, Inc. ,137 the court stated that "there is a purely
private right of action under the [Pennsylvania] ERA absent any type
of state action .... 138
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that any need for the ERA today would seem
to have diminished in light of more recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence handed down since 1983. Since then, the Supreme Court
has significantly ratcheted up the standard the government must meet
in order to discriminate based on sex.
In U.S. v. Virginia,139 the Court stated that "[p]arties who seek
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action." 140 The Court
also stated, "The burden of justification is demanding and it rests
entirely on the State."' 4 1 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence
in that case, the Court had in effect made the government's burden
133. Id.
134. Beck, supra note 124, at 715.
135. 182 F. Supp. 2d 453 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
136. Id. at 458 (citing Welsch, 494 A.2d at 412).
137. No. 02-CV-4421, 2003 WL 22232869 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2003).
138. Id. at *4.
139. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
140. Id. at 531.
141. Id. at 533.
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more difficult than it had been previously. As Rehnquist wrote, "that
phrase [exceedingly persuasive justification]... was first used ... as
an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not [as
the majority opinion used it] as a formulation of the test itself."' 142
Justice Scalia, in dissent, pointed out that the standard governing
review of the government's actions that discriminate based on sex that
had previously been in place was "a standard that lies between the
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny. We have
denominated this standard 'intermediate scrutiny' and under it have
inquired whether the statutory classification is substantially related to
an important governmental objective. ' ' 143 Yet in U.S. v. Virginia,
Justice Scalia pointed out that the majority in that case had "execute[d]
a defacto abandonment of the intermediate scrutiny that has been our
standard for sex-based classifications for... decades,"' 44 and replaced
it with an even higher standard.
Be that as it may, amid calls for the ERA's renewed passage
from Congress, it is worth noting the judicial decisions that have been
handed down since the ERA was last debated in Congress in 1983 in
states whose state-level ERA's are identical to the federal ERA.
During that debate in 1983, Representative Sensenbrenner said:
As we all know, the first submission of the equal rights
amendment failed to be ratified by 38 State
142. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 570-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
144. Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Jody Feder, Sex Discrimination and the
United States Supreme Court: Developments in the Law 3-4 (Congressional Research Service,
RL20253, 2007) ("In US. v. Virginia, the Court conducted a more searching form of
intermediate scrutiny to find unconstitutional the exclusion of women from the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI). Although the Court reiterated that a classification must be
substantially related to an important govenment interest, the Court also required the state to
establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for its actions.") (emphasis added).
In light of this development, it is worth noting that at the 1983 House Judiciary
Committee markup of the ERA, Representative Edwards went to great pains to argue that even
the adoption of the federal ERA would not lead to the integration of the Virginia Military
Academy, which the Supreme Court subsequently required even absent a federal ERA in U.S.
v. Virginia. At the 1983 markup, Representative Hall asked Representative Edwards "I can
think offhand of the ... Military Academy, VMI, one of just several that are for male students
only. Would [the ERA] prohibit those colleges from continuing to operate as a single-sex
college?" 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 148-49. Representative Edwards replied, "I
believe the gentleman is describing a private school, without heavy State or Federal
involvement, and it would not apply, the ERA would not apply." Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
To which Representative Lungren replied, ironically in hindsight, "It will be very nice in the
U.S. Supreme Court to cite the soothing comments of the gentleman from California, Mr.
Edwards, as to what we intended or did not, but I would suggest that the Supreme Court
makes the ultimate decision and we will have no appeal from that." Id. at 151.
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legislatures .... In my opinion, that failure was a direct
result of the amendment's proponents' inability to
answer critical questions on many emotional and social
issues that it raised. These include questions such as
whether women would be drafted into the military
should Congress decide at some future time to reinstate
conscription; whether homosexual marriages would be
legalized; whether the amendment would mandate
equal auto and life insurance premiums for men and
women; and whether ratification of the ERA would
require taxpayer funding of non-elective
abortions ....
Representative Sensenbrenner's notion was disputed by
Representative Pat Schroeder, a Democrat from Colorado, who said at
the time, "we have many states, such as mine, Colorado, that have
passed the exact same language as the Equal Rights Amendment and
have a long case history that puts many, many, many of the...
arguments to bed.'
146
Since 1983, however, many more cases have been handed
down under state-level ERAs, and Representative Sensenbrenner's
questions have been much more fully answered in large part by judges
in six states the constitutions of which contain ERAs nearly identical
to that proposed for the federal Constitution. In New Mexico, judges
have relied on the ERA to require government funding of abortions,
and, in Colorado, judges have relied on the ERA to hold that
pregnancy classifications constitute unconstitutional sex
discrimination. Judges in Pennsylvania and Washington have relied on
the ERA to require the integration of boys and girls in athletic events
at public schools under a rationale that undermines the Supreme
Court's analysis in Rostker v. Goldberg, which upheld the male-only
military registration system. Judges in Hawaii have relied on the ERA
to require the recognition of same-sex marriages. And judges in
Pennsylvania, Washington, and Maryland have relied on the ERA to
prohibit sex classifications in insurance pricing.
There are many unknowns regarding the future consequences
of any constitutional amendment,'47 but state judges in states that have
145. Equal Rights Amendment House Hearings, supra note 2, at 2.
146. 1983 House transcript, supra note 1, at 12.
147. Research has shown that among the many variables that govern decisions under the
ERA is the gender composition of the courts. As one recent study concluded, "the presence of
an ERA [in state constitutions] significantly increases the likelihood of a court applying a
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ERA's nearly identical to the proposed federal ERA have substantially
clarified, for good or ill, what the consequences of the adoption of a
federal ERA would be.
higher standard of law, which in turn significantly increases the likelihood of a decision
favoring the equality claim." Lisa Baldez, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Does the U.S.
Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?, 35 J. LEGAL STuD. 243, 243 (2006). The
same study found that, in states with ERA's, the greater the fraction of female judges on the
bench, the higher the likelihood that a higher standard would be applied to prevent sex
discrimination. See id at 268 ("The fraction of women on the bench holds particularly
impressive explanatory power. As that fraction increases ,... the probability of applying a
higher standard of law soars, even after controlling for the presence of an ERA.").
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